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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent : PETITION FOR REHEARING 
VS. : 
DAVID R. WARDEN, : Case No. 880575-CA 
De fendant/Appe11ant. : 
Defendant was initially tried by jury beginning November 
16, 1987; however, the Court declared a mistrial on November 18, 
1987 due to improper testimony given by one of the State's 
witnesses. A second jury trial was held beginning February 22, 
1988 and continuing through February 26, 1988. Defendant was 
convicted of the offense of Negligent Homicide as charged. 
The case was reviewed by the Court of Appeals and on 
November 22, 1989, the Court ruled by written opinion that the 
conviction should be reversed based on insufficiency of the 
evidence based upon the State's failure to establish a 
"substantial and unjustifiable risk of death." Although the 
Defendant did allege in his appeal the insufficiency of evidence, 
his argument was that the State had failed to prove causation. 
The issue of nature and degree of risk was neither briefed nor 
argued before the court. Petitioner does not contest the court's 
authority to review the matter sua sponte on that issue, but 
requests an opportunity for rehearing to fully address the issue 
before the court. 
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NOW THEREFORE, COMES NOW the State of Utah and petitions 
the Court for a rehearing pursuant to Rule 35 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure. Melvin C. Wilson, Davis County Attorney, 
and Brian J. Namba, Deputy Davis County Attorney, certify herein 
that the petition is presented in good faith and not for delay. 
POINT I. 
THE COURT MISAPPREHENDED OR MISINTERPRETED THE 
STANDARD OF REVIEW BY FINDING THAT A JURY 
"COULD HAVE" FOUND REASONABLE DOUBT RATHER 
THAN THAT THE JURY "COULD NOT HAVE BUT" FOUND 
REASONABLE DOUBT. 
Petitioner claims the following point of law has been 
overlooked or misapprehended by the Court in rendering its 
decision: 
In reviewing the conviction, we do not 
substitute our judgment for that of the jury. 
*It is the exclusive function of the jury to 
weigh the evidence and to determine the 
credibility of the witnesses....' State v. 
Lamm, 606 P.2d 229,231 (Utah 1980); accord 
State v. Linden. 657 P.2d 1364, 1366 (Utah 
1983) . 
So long as there is some evidence, including 
reasonable inferences from which findings of 
all the requisite elements of the crime can 
reasonably be made, our inquiry stops. State 
v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342 at 345 (Utah 1985). 
The Court correctly cited the standard of review 
enunciated in State v. Tolman, 775 P.2d 433, 424 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989); State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 245 (Utah 1985), quoting 
State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983). 
The court's opinion indicates that the court failed to 
adhere to that standard in the instant case: 
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"Thus, reasonable minds could examine the 
evidence presented and entertain a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant committed the crime 
of which he was convicted." opinion at p. 8 
That statement is clearly not the standard established 
by the cases cited. Under the established standard, the court 
should only overturn the conviction if "...reasonable minds must 
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime of which he was convicted." State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 
443, 444 (Utah 1983), emphasis added. 
The court further misapplied the standard of review in 
its assessment of the evidence: 
This response merely reinforces our conclusion 
that his testimony, as well as that of the 
other experts for the State, must be construed 
in light of the fact that home delivery, 
though legal, is not a widespread practice by 
doctors in Utah." opinion at p. 8 (emphasis 
added) 
By making that conclusion, the court has removed from 
the jury the function of assessing the weight of the evidence. 
"To establish criminal negligence, it is 
necessary to show conduct which is 'a gross 
deviation from the standard of care that an 
ordinary person would exercise in all the 
circumstances as viewed from the actor's 
standpoint.'...It is therefore a subjective 
element requiring consideration of all 
relevant circumstances surrounding the 
incident." State v. Ruben, 663 P.2d 445 (Utah 
1983) . 
The State's expert witness was examined with regard to 
his attitudes and prejudices regarding home delivery. The jury 
is at liberty to consider those factors as well as the highly 
specialized training and qualifications of the witness in 
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assessing the credibility of the witness. To defense counsel's 
question regarding the witness's opinion of home delivery, the 
witness responded as follows: 
Q: Now, Doctor, with reference to home 
deliveries — and let's talk philosophically 
now a bit in the medical field. With 
reference to home deliveries, as a 
neonatologist, it's my understanding that your 
professional view is that they should not 
occur? 
A: That's, to me, a naive approach to the 
problem because it does occur and I think home 
deliveries are appropriate in many 
circumstances. (T. Vol.V p.266) 
The witness was further questioned about the standard of 
practice in the medical community regarding home births, which he 
openly admitted was not favorable. To say that the testimony of 
an expert must be construed in a particular light based on the 
practice of the medical community and not on the expert's own 
practice or opinion is inconsistent with the standard of review 
established under Utah law. 
POINT II. 
THE STATE MET IT'S BURDEN TO PROVE CRIMINAL 
NEGLIGENCE BY PROVING A SUBSTANTIAL AND 
UNJUSTIFIABLE RISK THAT THE CIRCUMSTANCES 
EXISTED AND FURTHER THAT THE RESULT WOULD 
OCCUR. 
This court ruled that the State failed to meet it's 
burden to prove criminal negligence by failing to prove a 
"substantial and unjustifiable risk". In a prosecution for 
second degree murder under U.C.A. 76-5-203 (c), the State must 
prove a "grave risk of death"; however, in the case of 
manslaughter or negligent homicide, the risk element applies to 
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either (a) that the circumstances exist, or (b) that the result 
will occur. U.C.A. 76-2-103 (3) and (4). 
In this case the State may prove criminal negligence by 
proving a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death, or a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk that Jareth Young's diagnosed 
condition would progress and that Ivy Young would not recognize 
the symptoms. 
The Utah Supreme Court recognized in State v. Bolsinaer 
699 P.2d 1214 (Utah 1985) that a jury could take into account 
several factors in evaluating conduct: 
In Neitzel. supra, the court enumerated 
four determining factors a jury should be 
asked when it evaluates conduct resulting in 
death and alleged to be depraved indifference: 
(1) the utility of the defendant's conduct, 
(2) the magnitude of the risk, (3) the 
defendant's knowledge of the risk, (4) any 
precautions taken by the defendant to minimize 
the risk. Bolsinaer at 1220, referring to 
Neitzel v. State, 655 P.2d 325 (Alaska 
App.1982) 
The jury was entitled to assess each of the above 
factors in relation to this case to determine whether the 
defendant was criminally negligent. The court should not reverse 
the jury's conclusions unless it finds there is no evidence to 
support those conclusions. 
1. THE UTILITY OF DEFENDANT'S CONDUCT. It is 
undisputed that the family requested a home delivery and that 
there is some social utility to the practice of home birth. The 
question is what social utility there was to leaving Jareth Young 
in his diseased condition in the care of ivy Young, an 
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inexperienced lay person. The jury was entitled to accept the 
testimony of Ivy Young that the defendant left her with no 
instructions as to what to watch for and that Ivy Young asked the 
defendant if the victim ought not be hospitalized. The jury is 
further entitled to question the utility of Defendant's failure 
to diligently attend his patients before and after delivery. 
The jury should further be able to assess the social 
utility of practicing home birth medicine while not maintaining 
malpractice insurance and not being authorized to admit patients 
into a hospital. 
2. MAGNITUDE OF THE RISK. The magnitude of the risk 
can best be assessed by the amount that the risk of death is 
increased by defendant's decision to leave the victim in the care 
of a lay person, the grandmother, Ivy Young. Dr. Chan testified 
that so doing increased the probability of death ten to twenty 
times. 
The single most important factor in determining the 
nature and magnitude of the risk is the fact that Hyaline 
Membrane Disease is a progressive disease. That is, given all 
infants of this gestational age who contract the disease, five to 
fifteen percent can be expected to die without medical 
intervention. The probability of death increases as the disease 
progresses. The experts agreed that as medical intervention 
became necessary, time became an increasingly important factor. 
3. THE DEFENDANT'S KNOWLEDGE OF THE RISK. Defendant 
acknowledged on the witness stand that he had diagnosed the 
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disease, that he was aware it was progressive in nature, and that 
it was potentially fatal (T. Vol. IV, p.176). He had even made 
the determination that the baby would be better off in the 
hospital (T. Vol. IV, p.174). Sharon Johnson asked Defendant if 
the child shouldn't be hospitalized but he told her it wouldn't 
be necessary (T. Vol. IV, p.126). 
4. PRECAUTIONS TAKEN BY THE DEFENDANT TO MINIMIZE THE 
RISK. Emphasis has been placed by both the State and the 
Defendant upon the decision to leave the victim in the care of a 
lay person, the grandmother. That act alone, however, is not the 
only act for which Defendant should be held accountable. 
Consideration should be given to the immediate prenatal care or 
lack thereof, and the total absence of a reasonable course of 
follow-up care after the birth. The jury instruction given by 
the court stated: 
The standard of care to be applied in 
this case is that which is applicable to a 
physician practicing general medicine in 
connection with the pregnancy, labor, delivery 
and aftercare of a mother and newborn infant 
in the circumstances of this case. (R. at page 
53) 
The Defendant failed to minimize the risks that existed 
early in the day prior to delivery. He knew that the established 
due date was several weeks off yet he failed to personally attend 
the patient, a fact the defendant admitted on the witness stand 
was an error in judgment (T. Vol.IV, p.163). 
The Defendant could have minimized the risk of premature 
birth by Tocolysis (T. Vol.Ill, p.179). He could have slowed 
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the onset of labor by methods available in a homebirth setting 
(T. Vol.IV, p.131). He could then have had the baby delivered in 
a hospital setting, as would have been his own normal practice 
even under these conditions, since he would not normally deliver 
a premature baby in a home (T. Vol.IV, p.149). He further 
admitted that Tocolysis in a hospital setting was within his own 
practice (T. Vol.IV, p.131). 
While the defendant was still in the home during the 
immediate aftercare of the baby, he failed to take precautions 
which could have saved the life of the baby. He could have 
immediately hospitalized the baby, an alternative within his 
practice (T. Vol.Ill, p.126). He could have remained longer in 
the home himself. He could have arranged for a nurse or other 
trained professional to monitor the progress of the disease. He 
could have provided Ivy Young with a specific list of symptoms 
with an objective standard for observation. He could have 
provided Ivy with a protocol for action more thorough than just 
to call him. 
After the Defendant left the home he committed the 
greatest failure to minimize the risk. He knew that the disease 
was progressive and that the probability of survival decreased as 
the disease progressed yet he failed to call on the Youngs until 
noon the next day (T. Vol.IV, p.111). 
The Defendant lives less than five blocks from the 
Youngs (T. Vol.IV, p.162). His office is six to eight blocks 
from the Youngs (T. Vol.IV, p.158). He had ample opportunity 
to visit or call upon the Youngs, but did not. 
8 
In this regard, the testimony that the infant might have 
survived if he had been hospitalized up to ten hours after birth 
underscores the duty of the Defendant to have checked on the baby 
within that time period. At approximately six and one-half hours 
after the birth, Defendant was awake, reading National Geographic 
(T. Vol.IV, p.105). He remained at home for some time before 
leaving to play raquetball at a club that did not open until 
eight and one-half hours after the birth (T. Vol.IV, p.105). Had 
he called on the Youngs at that time, he would have learned that 
Jareth was continuing to make grunting sounds and had an abnormal 
color (T. Vol.1, p.91). 
He returned from raquetball to his office about ten 
hours after the birth (T. Vol.IV, p.107). Had he checked with 
the Youngs at that time, he would have learned that the baby had 
stopped breathing at one time (T. Vol.1, p.94) and that Ivy was 
trying to contact him. 
POINT III. 
THE FACTS RELIED UPON BY THE COURT TO FIND 
INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE ARE UNRELIABLE AND 
CONTROVERTED BY CONFLICTING EVIDENCE. 
The court has misapprehended the statement of the 
witness regarding the "statistic" that only two percent of babies 
die of untreated Hyaline Membrane Disease. Indeed, the statistic 
of two percent is not even the testimony of the witness, but a 
creation of defense counsel in intense and confusing cross-
examination. 
The witness first stated clearly on direct examination 
that failure to provide therapy to an infant suffering from 
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Hyaline Membrane Disease at 33 to 34 weeks gestation created a 
probability of death of five, ten, or fifteen percent. 
Defense counsel created the two percent figure by first 
subtracting the lowest figure in the witness's statistic, that 
being 5%, from 100%, thus leaving 95% as representing the figure 
to be the expected number of survivors of the disease without 
treatment. Then counsel asked him on the stand to multiply that 
figure by 25%, a figure previously offered as the percentage of 
infants born at 33-34 weeks gestation who develop Hyaline 
Membrane Disease. The witness accepted a figure of 2% which was 
blurted out by an observer in the courtroom. The accurate result 
of that computation would be 23.75%, nothing near the 2% computed 
under pressure. Furthermore, had the computation been accurately 
performed, it would not have resulted in a meaningful statistic 
because the 95% statistic was already limited to the 25% of all 
infants born at 33-34 weeks gestation who develop the disease. 
It was out of frustration from the confusing form of 
cross-examination that the witness tried to clarify by saying, "I 
guess the message is it's very unusual and rare to lose a baby at 
this gestation and this birth weight from Hyaline Membrane 
Disease." That is, the loss of this infant was a senseless and 
preventable event. 
Defense counsel then made clear to the witness that he 
wanted to discuss the question of morbidity when there is 
treatment compared to when there is no treatment. The witness 
agreed to discuss those statistics with the caveat that they 
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relate only to a hospital setting where the babies are under 
observation by trained professionals. The context of that 
statement in the trial transcript is as follows: 
Q: Untreated it could be in the hospital 
or it could be—it doesn't matter where it is, 
I suggest. The bottom line is that the child 
is untreated; therefore, if you have Hyaline 
Membrane, 33 to 34 weeks and it's untreated, 2 
percent, two out of a hundred may die? 
A. We're not talking apples and oranges. 
If the baby is in the hospital and it's — 
see, there's no study where you say this baby 
will be treated and this baby will not be 
treated. I'm giving you the statistics of all 
babies in the hospital being watched and 
there's some babies you watch carefully and 
they don't need any treatment, don't require 
any treatment, and those babies — and if you 
say yes, if you're looking at those babies 
that are not treated, very few of them will 
die (T. Vol.Ill, p.260). 
It would be both unethical and inhumane to do a study in 
a hospital in which patients exhibiting symptoms requiring 
therapy are divided into two groups, one which will be treated 
and one which will not. The statistics quoted by the witness 
were for patients who were not treated because in the opinion of 
their physicians, therapy was not required. Under those 
circumstances, very few will die. 
Further, on re-direct the witness clarified his 
position: 
Q: Now, we've had some talk about 
percentages and it's a little bit confusing, 
so I just want to recap a bit. From the point 
of view of the doctor, leaving the home 30 
minutes after the birth of the baby, given the 
factors that the baby is 33 to 34 weeks in 
gestation, that it's four pounds, that it's 
got some blueness in its extremities and that 
it's making the grunting sounds, what can you 
say about that baby? 
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A. That baby had respiratory distress 
syndrome. That baby is having respiratory 
problems. That baby is sick. 
Q. All right. Now, do you say anything 
with regard to the probability of its dying 
from that disease if it's untreated or left in 
the care of a lay person? 
A. I think to leave a baby with Hyaline 
Membrane Disease with a lay person just 
creates increased problems of mortality for 
that baby, morbidity. 
Q. Can you give us any kind of a 
quantitative objective basis that we can 
develop as to what the degree of risk there is 
for that baby left in the care of a lay 
person? 
A. It is very high. You could say 10, 
20 — 20 times higher when left to a lay 
person to manage the baby (T. Vol.Ill, pp.278-
279) . 
Thus, beginning with the figure of 2% as the mortality 
rate for infants 33-34 weeks gestation with Hyaline Membrane 
Disease and untreated if left in the care of a lay person where 
the mortality rate increases 10 to 20%, risk of death to Jareth 
Young was 20 to 40%. Such a risk is certainly substantial and 
unjustifiable, particularly when the normal course that would 
have been followed by this Defendant (to not deliver premature 
babies in the home, T. Vol.IV, p.149) would have reduced the risk 
to 1%. 
The court relies on statements by the State's witnesses 
that the victim's vital signs were "acceptable." This conclusion 
is based on the objective Apgar score only. The physicians 
agreed that a score of "8" was an acceptable score but cautioned 
that if the other characteristics of this child were taken into 
consideration it would have to be concluded that this was not a 
well baby (T. Vol.Ill, pp.194-195 also p.255). 
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There is a real danger in this case of relying too 
heavily upon statistics and objective scores to determine the 
degree of risk. Although both the State and Defendant have 
presented statistics, the determination of criminal negligence 
should not be established by percentages of morbidity. It is to 
be determined by a subjective standard rather than an objective 
standard. State v. Ruben, supra at 448. Excessive reliance on 
objective scores detracts from the jury's duty to view all the 
circumstances. 
POINT IV 
A FINDING THAT THE JURY COULD HAVE FOUND FROM 
THE EVIDENCE THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS CRIMINALLY 
NEGLIGENT IS CONSISTENT WITH CASE LAW IN UTAH 
AND OTHER JURISDICTIONS. 
A reasonable jury could have concluded that the risk to 
Jareth Young was substantial and unjustifiable. Indeed, the Utah 
Supreme Court has found the evidence sufficient to sustain a 
finding of criminal negligence in death cases involving less 
probability of death. See State v. Hallet, 619 P.2d 335 (Utah 
1980) where the court found sufficient evidence to sustain a 
conviction of negligent homicide where defendant, acting as an 
accomplice, bent down a stop sign so it was not visible from the 
lane of travel; State v. McPhee 684 P.2d 57 (Utah 1984) where the 
evidence in an automobile homicide consisted of evidence of 
drinking, a state of intoxication so as to cause staggering and 
slurred speech and evidence of crossing three lanes of travel 
into the wrong lane of an intersecting street. 
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The Court cites case law dealing with "bad judgment" by 
a physician. This case is factually more consistent with the 
Montana case of State v. Hoffman, 639 P.2d 567 (Montana 1982) 
where a mother was found guilty of negligent homicide for failure 
to provide medical treatment for her son. The subject of failure 
to provide medical treatment is dealt with in Homicide—Lack of 
Medical Attention. 100 A.L.R.2d 483 (1965). 
The defendant in this case was neither qualified nor 
authorized to provide the treatment which would have saved this 
infant's life. His duty of care more closely resembles that of a 
parent or other person with a contractual duty of care than that 
of a physician. What was termed "bad judgment" was not his 
decision to treat or not treat, but rather whether to refer the 
case to a qualified neonatologist for treatment. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence in this case is highly controverted and 
subject to multiple interpretations. The jury deliberated under 
proper instructions and rendered a verdict consistent with those 
instructions and supported by the evidence. The verdict should 
therefore be upheld and the court should not substitute it's own 
interpretation of the evidence. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this/] Q I day of December, 1989. 
Brian J. Namba 
Attorney y£or Plaintiff/Respondent 
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